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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING
THE SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE POWER
TO REGULATE FOREIGN
COMMERCE
INTRODUCTION
Although the Constitution vests Congress with the power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,"' congressional delega-
tions of authority to the President and the President's independent
power to conduct the foreign relations of the United States combine
to invest him with substantial power to regulate foreign commerce.
However, executive action in the area of foreign commerce recently
has been challenged as ultra vires. Presidential attempts to deal with
a balance-of-payments deficit, with injury to the domestic steel
industry from a high level of steel imports, and with excessive
dependence upon foreign petroleum sources, have led an importer of
foreign goods, 2 a domestic consumers group,' and a group of states
in the Northeast" to seek 'judicial determinations that the President
had exceeded his authority.
In the first case, Yoshida International Inc. v. United States , 5
the presidential action, taken pursuant to statute, was held to be
outside the statutory delegation of power; in the second case, Con-
sumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 6 the President's
choice of action in reliance on his own authority in lieu of statutory
procedures was upheld; and in the third case, Massachusetts v.
Simon, 7 executive action, pursuant to statute, survived challenges
for failure to comply with statutory procedures as well as for asser-
tion of a power not granted by the statute.
In reaching these decisions, the federal courts have been forced
to reconcile the need to give the President the flexibility to handle
expediently complicated foreign commerce problems, with the con-
straints imposed upon his independent power by the Constitution
and upon his delegated authority by Congress. Practical considera-
tions dictate that, in certain areas, the President be given broad
powers: the economic and political interdependence of modern na-
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
2
 Yoshida Intl, Inc. v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 1155 (Cust. Ct. 1974), appeal
docketed, No. 75-6 C.C.P.A., Sept. 6, 1974 (1971 import surcharge) [hereinafter cited as
Yoshida]. See text at note 98 infra.
3 Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C.Cir. 1974),
aff'g Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973)
(voluntary restraint arrangements on steel) [hereinafter cited as Consumers]. See text at note
54 infra.
' Massachusetts v. Simon, Civil No. 74-0129 (D.D.C., Feb. 21, 1975), appeal docketed,
No. 75-1202, D.C. Cir., Mar. 25, 1975 (presidential proclamation of oil tariff). See text at note
122 infra.
5 378 F. Supp. 1155, 1167, 1175-76 (Cust. Ct. 1974).
6
 506 F.2d 136, 143-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Civil Nb. 74-0129 (D.D.C., Feb. 21, 1975).
778
FOREIGN COMMERCE
tions requires that the regulation of foreign commerce take account
both of international factors that the President, by virtue of his
control over the foreign relations apparatus of the United States, is
most fully cognizant of, and of domestic factors, such as national
security, that have substantial international significance. By its
broad statutory delegations of power to the President, Congress has
recognized that the United States cannot undertake to regulate
domestically its commerce with foreign nations without considering
the political and economic consequences that its action may have
within those nations. On the other hand, the exercise of the Presi-
dent's foreign commerce powers must be in accordance with con-
stitutional and statutory mandates.
These three recent challenges to executive action have required
the courts to determine the extent to which the President may act
upon his independent authority where he might have accomplished
the same results with statutory authority, and the degree of flexibil-
ity that may properly be accorded the President when he acts upon
Congress's mandate. In this comment, the effect of these decisions
upon the scope of the President's power to regulate foreign com-
merce will be explored. Initially, the source and nature of the
President's authority independent of legislative delegation of power
will be analyzed. Next, the limits imposed upon the exercise of that
power by the Constitution will be discussed. Finally, the President's
authority pursuant to statutory delegation, focusing on the breadth
of that mandate and the procedural limits imposed on its exercise,
will be examined.
I. THE SOURCE AND NATURE OF INDEPENDENT EXECUTIVE
POWER OVER FOREIGN COMMERCE
The President's independent authority to regulate foreign com-
merce is not directly granted by the Constitution but derives from
the President's extensive power in the overlapping area of foreign
affairs. Executive power to regulate foreign affairs is based on a
combination of the powers expressly granted by the Constitutions
and the powers which have been held to be implied in those ex-
pressly granted. 9 In addition, there is the amorphous and controver-
sial category of the President's "inherent" powers: the President's
share of the federal power inherent in sovereignty.
A. Presidential Power Over Foreign Affairs: The Source
of Power Over Foreign Commerce
Although broad presidential authority in the area of foreign
affairs is widely acknowledged, 1 D it finds little explicit support in the
s See text at notes 11-13 infra.
9 See text at notes 14-37 infra.
10 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 756 (1971) (Harlan,
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Constitution. The Constitution gives the President the power, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties"
and to appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls,' 2
and the function of receiving Ambassadors and other public Minis-
ters.' 3
 This is the extent of the President's enumerated independent
authority in foreign affairs. From this meager constitutional grant of
power has been implied complete executive control over the foreign
relations apparatus, which is the means by which the United States
communicates and negotiates with foreign nations.
This control over the foreign relations apparatus has in practice
invested the President with power to establish foreign policy as well.
The earliest formulation of this broad power was provided by John
Marshall in 1800. In justifying an extradition of one Jonathan
Robbins, assumed to be an American citizen, in response to a
request made to the President by Great Britain, Marshall stated to
the House of Representatives: "The President is the sole organ of the
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign ,nations."' 4
Marshall's "sole organ" formulation was repeated and expanded
more than a century later to become the current doctrinal basis for
the President's broad foreign affairs power. In United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.," Justice Sutherland spoke of "the
very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations . . "16
 Justice Sutherland justified the President's author-
ity not on the basis of implied powers, however, but with a different
theory: the President's "inherent" powers.
Curtiss-Wright involved a presidential proclamation, pursuant
to a Joint Resolution of Congress, prohibiting the sale of arms to
persons or countries engaged in a certain armed conflict in South
America. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation and others, charged
with the illegal sale of arms, persuaded the district court to quash
the indictment on the ground that the Joint Resolution was an
unlawful delegation of the legislative power of Congress to the
President.' 7 Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court, reinstated
the indictment, holding that the delegation was constitutional: Con-
gress could properly delegate a broader discretion to the President in
J., dissenting). See generally L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 37-65 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Henkin]; E. Corwin, The President 170-226 (4th rev. ed. 1957).
" U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
' 2 Id.
13 Id. § 3.
14 10 Annals of Cong. 613 (1800) [1799-1801], reprinted in 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) Appendix
note 1, at 26 (1820); see Henkin, supra note 10, at 300 n.18.
15 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
16 Id. at 320.
17 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 14 F. Supp. 230, 232, 235 (S.D.N.Y.
1936).
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foreign affairs than would be permissible in domestic matters. 18
Justice Sutherland reasoned that since the President, in his role as
the nation's communicator in foreign affairs, has a better opportun-
ity of knowing the conditions that prevail in foreign countries, and
may have access to confidential information, it would be unwise for
Congress to lay down narrow standards for his action in executing
the laws Congress enacts dealing with foreign affairs.' 9 Justice
Sutherland also reviewed the long history of broad delegation by
Congress and gave weight to the practical construction placed upon
the Constitution by the long-continued legislative practice. 2 °
Although expediency and the President's control over the
foreign affairs apparatus would have been sufficient to justify the
decision, Justice Sutherland's distinction between domestic and
foreign affairs was not based solely upon such practical considera-
tions. He took the opportunity in Curtiss-Wright to propound his
controversial sovereignty theory, which is the basis for the third
source of executive foreign affairs powers—the President's "inher-
ent" powers. Justice Sutherland reasoned that the power to conduct
foreign relations was an attribute inherent in sovereignty, and that
the states were never sovereign. 21 Rather, sovereignty in respect of
the colonies passed from Great Britain to the Union, and thence,
upon the adoption of the Constitution, to the United States of
America. Thus, since the states were never sovereign, they never
possessed foreign affairs power, and, consequently, this was not
among the powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amend-
ment. 22 Therefore, the power to conduct foreign relations was essen-
tially extra-constitutional and inherent in the federal government. 23
As to the distribution of this power among the branches of the
federal government, Justice Sutherland, citing Marshal1, 24 reasoned
that participation in the exercise of this power was significantly lim-
ited: "In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated,
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to
speak or listen as a representative of the nation." 25 Thus, Justice
Sutherland's sovereignty theory results in the same broad formulation
of the President's foreign affairs power that Marshall announced over a
century earlier. 26
From control over the means of communication in foreign
affairs, it was but a short step to a voice in the substance—the
foreign policy of the United States. Although there is evidence that
le 299 U.S at 319-22.
I° Id, at 320.
3° Id. at 322-30,
21 Id. at 316-17.
22 Id. at 316.
23 Id. at 315-19,
4
 Id, at 319, citing John Marshall's "sole organ" statement. See note 14 supra and
accompanying text.
23 299 U.S. at 319.
26 See text at note 14 supra.
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the Framers intended otherwise, 27 and despite periodic denials of
the President's policy-making authority by defenders of the theoreti-
cal distribution of powers, 28 in practice the making of policy has
proved to be an inevitable consequence of the President's communi-
cation of the attitudes, decisions, and commitments of the United
States in its relations with foreign nations. 29
This practical power has been given doctrinal support by later
decisions of the Supreme Court relying upon Justice Sutherland's
broad formulation in Curtiss-Wright. In 1937, one year after
Curtiss-Wright, in United States v. Belmont, 3° Justice Sutherland
himself had the opportunity to extend the reach of his theory.
Belmont was an action by the United States to recover from the
executors of a private banker a sum of money that had been depos-
ited with him by a Russian corporation. 31 The corporation had been
expropriated by the Soviet Union and the United States acquired the
claim pursuant to the Litvinov Assignment32 negotiated by the
President in .connection with the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions between the two countries. 33 In passing on the validity of the
assignment, Justice Suthe irland reiterated that foreign affairs were
exclusively within the control of the federal government and ob-
served further that this assignment and the agreements made in
connection therewith were not only within the President's authority
as the "sole organ," but also were not treaties so as to require the
advice and consent of the Senate. 34 As in Curtiss-Wright, Justice
Sutherland's statements were broader than necessary. Moreover,
what they sanction is executive authority not merely to communi-
cate and negotiate, but actually to determine the United States'
foreign policy with respect to the recognition of another nation.
That the President's power in the conduct of foreign relations
includes the power to determine policy was recognized in another
case involving the Litvinov Assignment, United States v. Pink,"
decided by the Supreme Court shortly after Justice Sutherland's
retirement. In Pink, Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, cited
Marshall's sole organ statement and recognized that: "The powers of
the President in the conduCt of foreign relations included the power,
22
 For a detailed discussion of the allocation of power contemplated by the Framers, see
Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1972) [herein-
after cited as Berger].
2° See Berger, supra note 27, passim; Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence, 1968 Duke
L.J. 619, 622-26.
29 See Henkin, supra note 10, at 47.
3° 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
31 Id. at 325-26.
32
 The Litvinov Assignment was in the form of a letter, dated November 16, 1933, to the
President of the United States from Maxim Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 211 (1942).
33 Id,
34 Id. at .330.
" 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
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without consent of the Senate, to determine the public policy of the
United States with respect to the Russian nationalization decrees." 36
Likewise, in a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter found it
"indisputable" that "the President's control of foreign relations in-
cludes the settlement of claims [and] . . . the power to establish . .
normal relations with a foreign country . . . ." 37
This uncritical reliance upon Marshall's statement has been
attacked recently by a distinguished commentator in an article de-
crying the presidential monopoly over foreign relations." He con-
vincingly demonstrates that Marshall's statement dealt only with the
President's function as the nation's communicator, and that the
Framers did not intend to grant the President broad substantive
powers over foreign relations, much less a monopoly. 39 Nonetheless,
despite its uncertain legal foundation, the President's practical con-
trol over foreign affairs seems unlikely to be significantly di-
minished. In reality, in view of the President's exclusive control over
the foreign relations apparatus, only sweeping action by Congress
can change the balance of power to favor the legislative branch—
action that could only be taken at the cost of crippling, at least
temporarily, the foreign relations apparatus of the United States.
Moreover, action by the Court to upset the distribution of power
seems unlikely. As recently as 1971, Justice Harlan, in the Pentagon
Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United States," said of Mar-
shall's statement: "From that time, shortly after the founding of the
Nation, to this, there has been no substantial challenge to this
description of the scope of executive power."'"
B. Exercise of Presidential Powers Over Foreign Commerce
in Reliance Upon Independent Powers
In view of the substantial overlap between foreign commerce
and foreign affairs, broad executive power to conduct foreign affairs
and to determine foreign policy might be expected to give rise to
executive power to regulate foreign commerce. However, unlike the
power to conduct foreign affairs, which derives from a constitu-
tional grant to the President, the power to regulate foreign com-
merce is expressly vested by the Constitution in the Congress. 42
Justice Sutherland's theory that foreign affairs powers are extra-
constitutional implies that the distribution of power in foreign
affairs between the President and Congress is not subject to the
doctrine of separation of powers. Nonetheless, the force of the
36 Id. at 229.
37 Id. at 240-41 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"I Berger, supra note 27, at 15-16.
19 Id, at 16-17.
4°
 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
41
 Id. at 756 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
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doctrine is such that a judicial determination that presidential action
regulating foreign commerce taken in reliance on his independent
powers was improper is likely to be expressed as a conclusion that
the power exercised by the President was legislative in nature and
therefore properly belonging to Congress unless specifically dele-
gated by statute. 'The regulation of foreign commerce has a gray
area in which a power may have both executive and legislative
characteristics. 43
 Thus, this conclusion will depend upon whether or
not Congress has clearly expressed a policy by legislation in the
area, and if so, whether the policy upon which the President's action
is based comports or conflicts with the congressional policy.
Three basic situations I are possible where the President takes
action to regulate foreign commerce in reliance upon his own inde-
pendent power rather than jupon authority delegated by statute: (1)
the policies reflected in th'e President's action may conflict with
policies adopted by Congress in legislation; (2) Congress may not
have legislated in the area in which the President acts; and (3) the
President may act in harMony with congressional policies, but
choose not to use available' statutory procedures, that would have
allowed him to achieve the same result.
 -
1. Presidential Action in Conflict with Congressional Policy
When the President tales action reflecting policies that conflict
directly with policies expresged by Congress pursuant to its constitu-
tional legislative power, that action is most likely to be characterized
as legislative and declared ultra vires. This is the kind of action that
was involved in the steel seizure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer." In order to avert a strike threatened by steel
workers during the Korean War, the President ordered the Secretary
of Commerce to seize most of the nation's steel mills. The mill
owners challenged the President's action. The President purported
to rely upon his independent constitutional powers. The Court
found, however, that the power exercised by the President was not
executive, but legislative. 45 The President imposed domestic sanc-
tions to enforce presidential policies that conflicted with congres-
sional policies: only four years earlier, when the Taft-Hartley Act
was under consideration, Congress had rejected an amendment that
would have authorized emergency seizures."
Justice Jackson, in his well-known concurring opinion in
Youngstown, characterized the President's illegal action as follows:
"When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb . . . . )/47
Such action can be sustained "only by disabling the Congress from
43 See Henkin, supra note 10, at
" 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
45 Id. at 587-88.
46 Id. at 586.
47
 Id. at 637.
89-123. 
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acting upon the subject."'" Of course, in view of Article I, section 8,
Congress may not be disabled from acting upon the regulation of
foreign commerce.
2. Presidential Action in an Area of Unexcercised Congressional
Power
When the President acts to regulate foreign commerce in an
area not occupied by statute, the President is likely to be on the
firmest ground. Since Congress has enacted comprehensive statutes
regulating foreign commerce by means of domestic restrictions such
as import quotas and tariffs," the regulation of foreign commerce in
an area that Congress has not entered is likely to involve interna-
tional means that are less clearly legislative and more easily charac-
terized as within the scope of the President's broad independent
foreign affairs power. Justice Jackson, in Youngstown, also recog-
nized this "zone of twilight in which [the President] and Congress
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncer-
tain," 5 ° and concluded that "[i]n this area, any actual test of power
is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law." 5 ' Thus,
whether the President may act on his own authority in this second
situation is likely to be resolved in the political arena, by congres-
sional ratification, disapproval, or silence. 52 The courts are unlikely
to become involved in these controversies since the typical means by
which the President acts in this second class of situations is the
executive agreement." Not only will a private plaintiff normally
lack standing to challenge such action, but the controversy is also
likely to involve a political question.
3. Congressionally-Approved Presidential Action Taken in
Contravention of Statutory Procedures: Consumers Union
When the President, acting upon a policy not contrary to Con-
gress's expressed will, nonetheless chooses not to use the prescribed
46 Id. at 637-38.
4° The principal statutes are: Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.	 1202-1654 (1970), and
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1970), as amended by Trade Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618 (Jan. 3, 1975), 88 Stat. 1978, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 6956;, Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1978 (adding 19 U.S.C. §* 2101 et seq.).
3°
 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
31 Id.
52 See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 (1947),
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, and executive agreement concluded pursuant to the President's independ-
ent foreign affairs power; has never been submitted to or approved by Congress. S. Metzger,
Lowering Nontariff Barriers 23-24 (1974).
33
 The legality of executive agreements has stirred much controversy, since an executive
agreement excludes the Senate from its constitutional role in the making of treaties. For
contrasting views, compare Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53
Yale L.J. 664 (1944) with McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (pts. 1-2), 54 Yale
L.J. 181, 535 (1945).
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statutory procedures to implement that policy, but instead relies
upon his independent authority, the presidential action is subject to
challenge. This kind of action presents the question whether the
statutory procedures are the exclusive method for implementing the
policy, thereby precluding independent executive action. This ques-
tion was the focus of a.1973 challenge to the action of the executive
branch in negotiating the Voluntary Restraint Arrangements on
Steel, (hereinafter VRA's or agreements) in Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. v. Kissinger. S 4 The VRA's were the result of
discussions between Japanese and European steel producers, on one
side, and State Department officials, on the other. The agreements
were expressed in letters of intent sent to the Secretary of State by
the Japanese and European steel producers, wherein the producers
voluntarily undertook to limit exports of steel to the United States
for the years 1969, 1970, and 1971. 55 The VRA's were subsequently
extended to cover 1972 through 1974. 56
The agreements were necessitated by injury to the domestic
steel industry resulting from a ten-fold increase in steel imports into
the United States during the period from 1958 to 1968. 57 Congress
had made available statutory procedures whereby the President
might have dealt with the problem: two provisions of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 58—the national security provision 59 and the
orderly marketing agreements provision60—authorized the Presi-
54
 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), aff'g Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v.
Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973).
53
 506 F.2d at 138.
36
 Id. at 139.
57 Id. at 138.
$s 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1970).
59
 Id. § 1862 (1970) (originally enacted as Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No.
87-794, § 232, 76 Stat. 877). Section 232 was subsequently amended, substituting the Secre-
tary of the Treasury for the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, and adding a
provision for public hearings, by the Trade Act of 1974, § 127(d), 88 Stat. 1993. Section
232(b), as amended, directs the Secretary of the Treasury, upon receipt of a request with
respect to an imported article, to make an investigation and to hold hearings to determine the
effect on the national security of imports of the article, and to report to the President his
findings and recommendation for action or inaction. It continues:
If the Secretary finds that such article is being imported into the United States in
such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national
security, he shall so advise the President and the President shall take such action,
and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its
derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security,
unless the President determines that the article is not being imported into the United
States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the
national security.
19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1970).
6°
 19 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) (originally enacted as Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-794, § 352, 76 Stat. 901). Section 352(a) provides:
After receiving an affirmative finding of the Tariff Commission under section
301(b) [19 U.S.C. § 1901(b) (1970)] with respect to an industry, the President may
. . . negotiate international agreements with foreign countries limiting the export
from such countries and the import into the United States of the article causing or
threatening to cause serious injury to such industry .. .
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dent, after following procedures providing for investigation, hear-
ings, and findings, to take action to adjust imports. The executive
branch considered and rejected the statutory procedures, seeking to
avoid undesirable side-effects on United States foreign relations,
which it anticipated from official mandatory restrictions. 61
The plaintiff, a consumer organization, sought a declaratory
judgment that the export limitations were illegal and an injunction
prohibiting the defendants—certain state department officials and
the foreign producers—from acting in furtherance of the arrange-
ment. 62 Despite plaintiff's contention that the VRA's represented a
regulation of foreign commerce foreclosed to the President by Article
I, section 8 and by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the district
court's finding that the executive action was not ultra vires. 63 Al-
though acknowledging that Congress has occupied the field of
domestically-enforceable import restrictions, Judge McGowan,
speaking for the court, found that the VRA's were within the
President's independent foreign affairs powers since they were not
domestically enforceable. 64 He viewed the restraint undertakings
as essentially precatory in nature—mere "jawboning" as Judge
Danaher characterized them in a concurring opinion65—and not in
conflict with the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, whose provisions the
district court had found to be not the exclusive means by which the
President could lawfully regulate steel imports.
The VRA's depended for their effectiveness upon the willing-
ness of the foreign producers to limit their exports. In years when
the exports exceeded the agreed-upon limits, the President did not
attempt to stop the goods from entering the United States, but
simply persuaded the producers to reduce the next year's ship-
ments. 66
 Since the President was not relying upon delegated author-
ity to establish domestically-enforceable sanctions such as tariffs or
quotas, Judge McGowan found that the President was not required
to comply with the procedures established by the statutes delegating
that authority, but could properly act upon his independent foreign
relations powers. 67
 Judge McGowan concluded that the VRA's were
not exercises of legislative power since they were not enforceable by
sanctions applied domestically to imported goods. Had the court
found that the powers exercised were legislative, the President's
19 U.S.C. § 1982(a) (1970). Section 301(b) provides for an investigation by the Tariff
Commission of injury to domestic industry from an article imported in increased quantities as
a result in major part of concessions granted under trade agreements, 19. U.S.C. § 1901(b)
(1970).
e i 506 F.2d at 138, 142 n.10.
62 Id. at 139.
63 Id. at 138, 144.
64
 Id. at 143.
65
 Id, at 145 (concurring opinion).
66 Id. at 144 n.12.
67 Id, at 142-43.
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action would of course have violated the separation of powers
doctrine and would therefore have been ultra vires. The President
would then have been forced to follow statutory procedures to
control the steel imports.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Leventhal took issue with the
court's conclusion that the VRA's were not enforceable. Characteriz-
ing the arrangements as "solemn negotiated bilateral understand-
ings,"68 he emphasized that, in return for the self-imposed limita-
tions, the United States Government gave assurances to the foreign
producers that disadvantages would be equalized among producers
and that the President would not initiate other unilateral import
limitations or duty increases. 69 Moreover, Judge Leventhal argued
that the President could have enforced the agreements by applying
non-judicial sanctions, such as a call to Congress for reduction of
assistance programs or a direction to customs officials to deny entry
to the commodities, and possibly by seeking judicial enforcement as
well."
The dissent's argument is not persuasive: the kind of executive
sanctions he foresaw were not realistic possibilities. An executive
call for reduction of assistance programs is not only unlikely, it is
not even an executive sanction since it depends upon congressional
action; an executive direction to customs officials to deny entry
would be a regulation of commerce of a legislative character without
reliance upon statutory procedures, which would be ultra vires. In
his dissent, Judge Leventhal omitted the President's most likely
recourse if the VRA's failed of their purpose: the invocation of those
same statutory powers pursuant to the national security or orderly
marketing agreements provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962" that were originally rejected by the State Department as
unduly formal. Presidential forbearance to impose formal import
restrictions pursuant to statute was expressly mentioned in the let-
ters of intent, and under Judge Leventhal's view of the VRA's as
bilateral agreements, was consideration for the producers' self-
imposed restraints.
The essential question in Consumers was whether the executive
action actually taken was legislative in character. To recognize that
legislative authority delegated to the President by statute, not judi-
cial authority invoked to support other sanctions, was the backstop
of the VRA's is to perceive the flaw in Judge Leventhal's analysis:
that the President, had his jawboning failed, would have resorted to
delegated legislative authority does not mean that the jawboning
itself was legislative action. On the contrary, jawboning is a type of
action within the scope of the President's role as the nation's com-
municator in foreign affairs. The issue was not whether the result
63 Id. at 149 (dissenting opinion).
69 Id. at 150-51 (dissenting opinion).
'° Id.
71 See text at notes 59-60 supra.
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could also have been achieved by legislative action or whether the
executive action involved a policy decision, but rather whether the
executive action usurped the lawmaking function of Congress. 72 By
deciding that the agreements lacked the force of domestic law, 73 the
majority properly answered this question in the negative.
The court's decision in Consumers recognized the need to ac-
cord the President the flexibility to take account of the international
effects of foreign commerce regulation undertaken by the United
States for the benefit of the domestic economy. Admittedly, allowing
the President the choice not to use available statutory authority
necessarily sacrificed statutory procedural safeguards. These safe-
guards, principally investigations and public hearings, are arguably
important where the President's independent action has the same
effect on imports that legislative action would have had. It is sub-
mitted that this concession to the President's discretion is justified by
the practical advantages to be gained by its exercise. Moreover, the
power of Congress to check abuses of that discretion by overriding
legislation adequately compensates for the loss of the statutory
safeguards.
Consumers thus resolves the third kind of situation in which the
President takes action to regulate foreign commerce in favor of the
President. It indicates that when the policy pursued by the President
in regulating foreign commerce is consistent with that adopted by
Congress74—here, the protection of a domestic industry essential to
the national security from the adverse consequences of large in-
creases in imports—and when presidential action does not depend
upon domestic sanctions to be effective, a court may find that the
statutory procedures are not exclusive. As in the second situation,
where Congress has not acted, this finding is likely to be expressed
as a conclusion that the executive action is not legislative in charac-
ter and therefore is within the President's broad foreign affairs
powers." This result is desirable since it allows a flexible approach
72 The formulation of policy is only the first component of legislative action; the second is
the promulgation of a law—an enforceable sanction: "The essentials of the legislative function
are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a
defined and binding rule of conduct . . . ." Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944).
73 Consumers, 506 F.2d at 143. See text at notes 63-67 supra.
74 The national security provision of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1862
(1970) (originally enacted as Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 232, 76
Stat, 877), as amended by Trade Act of 1974, § 127(d), 88 Stat. 1993, by giving the President
the power to adjust imports of articles threatening to impair the national security, expressed a
congressional policy in accord with the action taken here by the President. Moreover, the
VRA's, when transmitted by the Secretary of State to the Chairmen of the Senate Finance
Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee were welcomed, and "In]o mandatory
import quota legislation was recommended by the committees thereafter." Consumers, 506
F.2d at 138 n.4.
75
 Although the availability of delegated authority contributes to the President's bargain-
ing power and it may therefore be argued that the President should not be able to rely in effect
on delegated authority without following statutory procedures, nonetheless, the delegated
authority is only one source of the President's bargaining power in his role as the nation's sole
organ.
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to the delicate problems of foreign relations without doing violence
to the constitutional allocation of powers between the President and
Congress.
The holding of Consumers may have application beyond the
regulation of foreign commerce, both internationally and domesti-
cally. Consumers ratifies inherent executive power to the extent that
the President can achieve results without recourse to statutory au-
thority. Where the President does not need domestically-enforceable
sanctions, the promulgation of which is exclusively a legislative
function, he may rely upon precatory action—"jawboning"—on the
basis of the practical power inherent in his office.
III. EXECUTIVE ACTION IN RELIANCE UPON AUTHORITY
DELEGATED BY STATUTE
The broad powers vested in the executive branch by the express
and implied grants of the Constitution are far exceeded by the
legislative authority Congress has delegated to the President by
statute. Much of the legislative power to regulate foreign commerce,
including large grants of its tariff-making power, has been conferred
upon the President by trade legislation, principally the Tariff Act of
1930, 76 the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 77 and the Trade Act of
1974. 78 The latter, enacted January 3, 1975, continues and expands
the grants of the previous acts and renews the President's authority
to negotiate trade agreements. 79 It extends his power to modify,
impose, or remove import restrictions, including duties and non-
tariff barriers," in implementing the agreements and it grants new
authority to deal with balance-of-payments deficits and surpluses. 81
The President's exercise of these delegated powers may raise one or
more of the following issues: (1) whether the delegation by Congress
was constitutionally permissible; (2) whether the kind of presidential
action take'n was within the scope of the delegated power; and (3)
whether the President has exercised the delegated authority in ac-
cordance with the procedures mandated by Congress.
A. Constitutionality of Congressional Delegation of Power
over Foreign Commerce to the President
That Congress may constitutionally delegate broad power to
the executive branch is well-established." Although the Constitu-
78
 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1654 (1970).
77 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (1970), as amended by Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-618, 88 Stat. 1978.
" 88 Stat. 1978 (adding 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101 et seq.). For an analysis of the provisions of
the Trade Act of 1974, see Whitney, The Trade Act of 1974: Coping With Unequal Environmen-
tal Control Costs, 16 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 577 (1975).
79 Trade Act of 1974, § 101, 88 Stat. 1982 (adding 19 U.S.C. § 2111).
a° Id. §§ 101-02, 88 Stat. 1982 (adding 19 U.S.C. §§ 2111-12).
al Id. § 122, 88 Stat. 1987 (adding 19 U.S.C. § 2132).
82 See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (discussed
in text at note 88 infra); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) (discussed in text at note 84 infra).
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tion vests the powers of the federal government in three branches
and although the doctrine of separation of powers ordains that no
one branch may exercise the whole power of another branch," it
has long been clear that the three branches must cooperate with
each other in order to exercise their powers effectively. Initially, the
courts denied that Congress could constitutionally delegate legisla-
tive power, while upholding congressional delegations of power to
the President, subject to certain restrictions on executive discretion,
on the ground that the power in question was not legislative. Thus,
in 1892, in Field v. Clark, S4 the Supreme Court, while giving lip
service to the principle of nondelegation, upheld a delegation of
power to the President to suspend the free introduction of certain
agricultural commodities if he determined that any producing coun-
try imposed "reciprocally unequal or unreasonable" exactions upon
United States products. 85 The Court found that the power delegated
was not legislative but rather only a power to determine facts, "the
event upon which [Congress's] expressed will was to take effect. "8 °
Over the years, these constraints have been loosened to the point
that it may fairly be said that delegation of legislative power is now
permissible."
The axiomatic thesis of nondelegability of legislative power was
further weakened by the broad delegation of tariff-making au-
thority that was upheld in J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States. 88 The Court in Hampton upheld presidential authority
granted by the flexible tariff provision of the Tariff Act of 1922. 89
The statute authorized him to adjust tariffs in order to equalize
differences in costs of production between domestic and foreign
goods. 9° The Court likened the tariff-making authority granted to
the President to the rate-setting authority of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, of which it said: "If Congress shall lay down by
legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative
action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power." 91
Only two cases, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan92 and A.L.A.
g3
 For a discussion of the separation of powers doctrine, see Forkosch, The Separation of
Powers, 41 U. Colo. L. Rev. 529 (1969). The essence of the doctrine is that "the whole power
of one of those departments [legislative, executive, judicial] should not be exercised by the
same hands which possess the whole power of either of the other departments . ." I J.
Story, Constitution 393 (5th ed. 1891), quoted in Note, 7 Vand. J. Trans. L. 137, 138 (1973).
54
 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
55 Id. at 680-94.
1/6
 Id. at 693.
IS 7
 For an argument that the nondelegation doctrine is dead, see K.. Davis, Administra-
tive Law Text § 2.01, at 26-27 (3d ed. 1972).
" 276 U.S. 394 (1928)..
19
 Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, § 315(a), 42 Stat. 941.
9° 276 U.S. at 413.
91 Id. at 409.
92
 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 93 both involving provi-
sions of the National Industrial Recovery Act," have invalidated
congressional delegation to the President. The Court in both cases
phrased the nondelegation doctrine in terms of congressional abdica-
tion of its lawmaking function, and characterized proper delegation
as requiring the provision of standards for the exercise of executive
discretion." Later cases have applied the requirement of standards
so loosely as to cast doubt on the current validity of Panama and
Schechter. 96 Whatever their present worth, since courts are reluc-
tant to intrude in an area reserved to the political branches, it is
unlikely that the discretion vested in the President by the current
trade legislation will be found to exceed the bounds of proper
delegation.
B. Recent Challenges to Presidential Action as Outside the
Scope of Authority Delegated by Statute: Yoshida
A question more likely to arise when the President acts to regu-
late foreign commerce, purportedly in reliance on his statutorily
delegated authority, is whether the statute authorized the kind of
action taken. Challenges on such grounds are often brought in the
Customs Court by persons seeking to avoid import restrictions im-
posed on their products. In the past, the challenged actions have
involved duties or quotas imposed upon foreign goods for the pro-
tection of specific domestic industries. 97
Recent presidential action, however, has had a broader pur-
pose: in 1971, President Nixon proclaimed a temporary ten percent
surcharge on all imports in order to alleviate a substantial balance-of-
payments deficit. In the 1974 Customs Court case of Yoshida Inter-
national, Inc. v. United States," this action was successfully chal-
lenged on the ground that it exceeded the authority delegated to the
President by the relevant statutes. The Customs Court interpreted
narrowly the technical provisions expressly relied upon by the Presi-
dent in his proclamation. These provisions were section 350(a)(6) of
the Tariff Act of 1930 99 and section 255(b) of the Trade Expansion
93
 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
94
 Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195.
95
 Panama, 293 U.S. at 415, 421; Schechter, 295 U.S. at 530.
96 See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1952);
Fahey v. Malone, 332 U.S. 245 (1947). See also K. Davis, Administrative Law Text § 2.03,
at 28-30 (3d ed. 1972). For an indication that Panama and Schechter may still have vitality
where individual rights are affected, see Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (denial of
passport; right to travel). .
97 See, e.g., Falcon Sales Co. v, United States, 199 F. Supp. 97 (Cust. Ct. 1961)
(clothespins); United States v. Schmidt Pritchard & Co., 47 C.C.P.A. 152, cert. denied, 364
U.S. 919 (1960) (bicycles).
96 378 F. Supp. 1155 (Cust. Ct. 1974), appeal docketed, No. 75-6, C.C.P.A., Sept. 6,
1974.
99
 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(6) (1970), formerly Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 350(a)(5) (as
added by Act of June 12, 1934, ch. 474, § 1, 48 Stat. 943).
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Act of 1962. 100 The court also construed narrowly section 5(b) of the
Trading with the Enemy Act,'°' upon which the President also
relied in his defense at trial.
Section 255(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 102 substan-
tially identical to section 350(a)(6) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 103
provides: "The President may at any time terminate, in whole or in
part, any proclamation made under this subchapter." The President
attempted to use the termination authority to impose the ten percent
surcharge by suspending prior proclamations carrying out trade
agreements "only insofar as is required to assess a surcharge in the
form of a supplemental duty amounting to 10 percent ad val-
orem."'"
The court concluded that this termination authority merely
provided the President with a mechanical procedure for supplanting
or replacing existing rates with ,rates that had been established by
prior proclamations or by statute, and did not include the power to
establish unilaterally a rate of duty that had not been previously
established.'°5 Although the court's technical analysis of section
255(b) was extremely narrow and took no account of the economic
effect of its interpretation,' 06 on principle the interpretation is cor-
rect. Section 255(b) is part of Title. II of the 1962 Act, which deals
with the general subject of trade agreements; section 255(a) deals
with the termination of proclamations implementing trade agree-
ments. The court was justified in reading a technical provision
incident to trade agreement authority as not authorizing unilateral
presidential exercise of the taxing power vested in Congress by the
Constitution.'" Since the power to tax is expressly vested in Con-
gress by the Constitution, it is clearly legislative and may not fairly
be included within the President's independent foreign affairs pow-
ers.'" Although Congress may and has delegated the taxing power
to the President to enable him to regulate foreign commerce,'° 9,
l" 19 1T.S.C. § 1885(6) (1970) (originally enacted as Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub.
L. No. 87-794, § 255(b), 76 Stat. 880).
101 50 U.S,C. Appendix § 5(b) (1970).
1 ° 2 19 U.S.C. § 1885(b) (1970) (originally enacted as Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub.
L. No. 87-794, § 255(b), 76 Stat. 880).
1°3 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(6) (1970), formerly Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 350(a)(5) (as
added by Act of June 12, 1934, ch. 474, § 1,. 48 Stat. 943).
104 Proclamation 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15724 (1971).
105 378 F. Supp. at 1162.
106 The result of the court's reasoning is that although the President would not have the
power to establish a rate of duty intermediate between the rate being terminated and the
statutory rate, he could effectively reinstate the statutory rate, thereby restoring tariffs to the
levels existing in 1930, which would give a severe shock to the economy. The report of the
Senate Finance Committee on the Trade Act of 1974 indicates that § 125(e) was enacted in
response to a request by the executive branch for an explicit procedure to avoid this "spring
back" effect. S. Rep. No. 93-1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 8246, 8303.
1 ° 7 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8.
mil See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 58 (1933).
109 See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (upholding
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delegation of taxing power should be found only where it clearly
appears that Congress so intended. Here the President's power is at
its lowest ebb; he has neither independent nor statutorily delegated
authority.
In disposing of the second provision relied upon by the United
States, section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act,'" the court,
by distinguishing the power to regulate foreign commerce from the
taxing power, adhered to its determination to require clear evidence
of congressional intention to delegate its taxing power. The court
emphasized that the two powers are granted by separate clauses of
Article I, section 8, and although the taxing power may be used for
the purpose of regulating commerce, it is not fairly included within
the commerce power.'" Thus, since section 5(b) authorizes the
President, to "regulate . . . importation or exportation" by means of
"instructions, licenses, or otherwise," 12 it was necessary for the
court to determine the meaning of "instructions, licenses, or other-
wise." The court reviewed the history of the Act and its predecessors
and found that a distinguishing feature of the Act was its "estab-
lishment of a system of licenses and permits for the control of
property during a time of war and crisis," 13 which did not include
license fees or duties. Again the court's conclusion is constitutionally
sound. Although the language of section 5(b) may be interpreted to
include the taxing power, to find such a broad grant in a statute
dealing not with commerce generally but with the regulation of the
importation and exportation of foreign-owned property in time of
war would be a significant judicial expansion of presidential powers
not intended by Congress.
Notwithstanding the sound statutory and constitutional basis
for the Yoshida decision, there is room for dispute whether, as a
practical matter, it may have been wiser for the court to uphold the
presidential action. The court's opinion gives no indication that it
considered the consequences of its holding in view of the thousands
of protests filed. 14 Its decision, if upheld on appeal, will involve, as
the Senate Finance Committee recognized in its report on the Trade
Act of 1974, "substantial loss of revenue to the U.S. Treasury and
windfall gains to those importers who passed on the import sur-
charge to consumers."'" The President's action in response to a
serious balance-of-payments deficit was the only expedient way of
dealing with a temporary phenomenon. Since section 5(b) of the
congressional delegation of taxing power to the President by the flexible tariff provision of the
Tariff Act of 1922). For examples of current provisions delegating the taxing power, see Trade
Act of 1974, §§ 101, 203, 88 Stat. 1982, 2015 (adding 19 U.S.C. §§ 2111, 2253).
11 ° 50 U.S.C. Appendix § 5(6) (1970).
1 " 378 F. Supp. at 1170-71.
"2
 50 U.S.C. Appendix § 5(b) (1970).
"3
 378 F. Supp. at 1172.
"I See S. Rep. No. 93-1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 8246, 8423.
" 5 Id., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 8297.
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Trading with the Enemy Act also extends to national emergen-
cies,'" the court could have interpreted its language to authorize
the President's actions. Although expediency does not justify dis-
turbing the constitutional allocation of power, Congress did delegate
broad power to the President to deal with emergencies and the
language that empowered the President to "regulate" the "importa-
tion or exportation"' of foreign-owned property by means of "instruc-
tions, licenses, or otherwise" may be read as investing the President
with the tariff power.
Fortunately, the President need no longer resort to technical
provisions to deal with balance-of-payments problems. Section 122
of the Trade Act of 1974 117 gives the President broad authority to
deal with both deficits and surpluses in the balance of payments, as
well as with the depreciation of the dollar in foreign exchange
markets. " 8 Under section 122(a), in case of a deficit, the President
has the option of imposing a surcharge of not more than 15 percent,
a quota, or a combination of the two. The action is authorized in the
case of "large and serious" deficits; if the President determines that
action under section 122(a) would be contrary to the national in-
terest, then he is required by section 122(b) to so inform Congress
and to convene a group of congressional official advisors designated
by another section of the Act19 to consult with them as to his
reasons for that determination. The section also contains a subsec-
tion authorizing termination of proclamations made under the sec-
tion.' 20 Thus, the Trade Act of 1974, by giving broader power to
the President, will probably minimize litigation over his exercise of
the tariff power.
116 The President, in Proclamation 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15724 (1971), did declare a
national emergency. This proclamation, but not the emergency thereby declared, was itself
terminated by Proclamation 4098, 36 Fed. Reg. 24201 (1971).
112
 Trade Act of 1974, § 122, 88 Stat. 1987 (adding 19 U.S.C. § 2132).
Ill Section 122(a) provides in part:
(a) Whenever fundamental international payments problems require special
import measures to restrict imports—
(1) to deal with large and serious United States balance-of-payments
deficits,
(2) to prevent an imminent and significant depreciation of the dollar in
foreign exchange markets, or
(3) to cooperate with other countries in correcting an international
balance-of-payments disequilibrium,
the President shall proclaim, for a period not exceeding 150 days (unless such period
is extended by Act of Congress)—
(A) a temporary import surcharge, not to exceed 15 percent ad valorem, in
the form of duties (in addition to those already imposed, if any) on articles
imported into the United States;
(B) temporary limitations through the use of quotas on the importation of
articles into the United States; or
(C) both a temporary import surcharge described in subparagraph (A) and
temporary limitations described in subparagraph (B).
Trade Act of 1974, § 122(a), 88 Stat. 1987 (adding 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a)).
.
	
	 119
 Trade Act of 1974, § 161(a), 88 Stat. 2008 (adding 19 U.S.C. § 2211(a)).
120
 Id. § 122(g), 88 Stat, 1989 (adding 19 U.S.C. 2132(g)).
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In the event that Yoshida is reversed on appeal, a repetition of
presidential action in reliance on his termination power will be
averted by section 122(h), which provides: "No provision of law
authorizing the termination of tariff concessions shall be used to
impose a surcharge on imports into the United States." 121 If the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals finds that the surcharge was
authorized by section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, the
President's authority to deal with future emergencies by means of
surcharges will still be open to question. Although a court might
read section 122 as indicating a congressional intention that only
balance-of-payments and dollar-depreciation problems be dealt with
by means of surcharges, nonetheless, the court might feel bound to
seek the intention of the Congress that enacted section 5(b). In that
case, that a later Congress granted taxing power to deal with spec-
ified problems would not restrict the use of taxing power found to be
delegated by section 5(b).
Whereas the Customs Court in Ybshida was faced with only the
single issue of whether the President's action was within the statu-
tory delegation, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia was recently required to decide in one action all three
issues involving the President's congressionally-delegated authority:
(1) whether the delegation itself was proper; (2) whether the action
taken was within the delegation; and (3) whether the action was
taken in accord with statutory procedures. Massachusetts v. Si-
mon, 122 brought by several northeastern states and several
utilities,' 23 questioned the President's authority to impose tariffs on
petroleum imports. By Presidential Proclamation 4341, 124 the Presi-
dent proclaimed the exaction of a "supplemental fee" on petroleum
and petroleum products, increasing from $1.00 per barrel on im-
ports entered on or after February 1, 1975, to $2.00 on imports on
or after March 1, 1975, and finally to $3.00 on imports on or after
April 1, 1975. 125 He relied expressly upon the authority conferred
upon him by section 232 of the Trade Eipansion Act of 1962.' 26
Section 232, the national security provision, empowers the Presi-
dent, after receiving a report of findings by the Secretary of the
Treasury that "[an] article is being imported into the United States
in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to
impair the national security," to take action to "adjust the imports."
The plaintiffs challenged this action on four grounds, three of which
are relevant here: first, that section 232(b) was an unconstitutional
121
 Id. § 122(h), 88 Stat. 1989 (adding 19 U.S.C. 2132(h)).
122 Civil No. 74-0129 (D.D.C., Feb. 21, 1975).
123 Id. The actions of the states and the utilities—filed separately—were consolidated for
decision.
124
 40 Fed. Reg. 3965 (1975) (proclamation issued Jan. 23, 1975).
123 Id. at 3967.
126
 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1970), as amended by Trade Act of 1974, § 127(d), 88 Stat. 1993.
For a discussion of § 232, see nate 59 supra.
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delegation by Congress of legislative authority; second, that the
authority to "adjust the imports" does not constitute a grant of
tariff-making power; and third, that the Secretary failed to comply
with requirements for investigation, hearings, and findings. 122
The court found no merit in the plaintiffs' contention that
section 232(b) was an unconstitutional delegation of congressional
power. 128 Acknowledging that delegation of the analogous tariff-
making power' 29 had always been accompanied by strict limitations
and conditions, Judge Pratt nonetheless found the "general and
somewhat imprecise" standards of section 232 adequate.' 3° He
noted that the Panama' 3 ' and Schechter' 32 cases had been under-
mined by recent decisions upholding delegations with only vague
standards or none at all.' 33 This result is proper: since the oil
situation is arguably within the independent foreign relations power
of the President, Congress should be given wide latitude in delegat-
ing its authority. Although the regulation of the importation of oil
involves domestic economic considerations, it also involves interna-
tional political and national security considerations. The need to
give weight to these latter factors dictates that the President, not
Congress, should be given the primary authority to control this
commodity.
To support their second contention—that the national security
clause did not delegate the power purportedly exercised—the plain-
tiffs relied principally on the history of the exercise of presidential
power under that clause. They argued that from the time of its
enactment as section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of
1955,' 34 until April 1973, the President administered the national
security provision without claiming that it included a power to exact
license fees. ' 35 The court found this argument unpersuasive, reason-
ing that if the phrase "to adjust the imports" includes quotas and
'27
	 No. 74-0129 (D.D.C., Feb. 21, 1975).
124 Id. The court quoted Professor Davis's statement that "(llawyers who try to win cases
by arguing that congressional delegations are unconstitutional almost invariably do more
harm than good to their clients' interests." Id., quoting 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise § 2.01,. at 75 (1958).
129 The court found implicitly that the license fee was not a tariff, in order to avoid what
it perceived as a jurisdictional problem. It read 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (1970) as vesting jurisdiction
in the Customs Court if this were a tariff. Civil No. 74-0129 (D.D.C., Feb. 21, 1975).
Whatever the validity of this determination as precedent, it was immaterial to the court's
reasoning whether the license fee was a tariff or a hybrid limitation.
"c' Civil No. 74-0129 (D.D.C., Feb. 21, 1975).
131
 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (discussed in text at note 92
supra).
133
 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (discussed in
text at note 93 supra).
133
 Civil No, 74-0129 (D.D.C., Feb. 21, 1975). Compare note 96 supra and accompany-
ing text.
134
 Act of June 21, 1955, ch. 169, 69 Stat. 162.
133
 Complaint of States at 8-9, Massachusetts v. Simon, Civil No. 74-0129 (D.D.C.,
Feb. 21, 1975).
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even a complete embargo, as plaintiffs conceded, it could reasonably
be read to include imports subject to fees. 136
The brevity of the discussion of this second argument does not
vitiate the court's conclusion. The legislative history of the national
security provision, although limited, does indicate that a major
purpose of the provision was to give the President broad authority
to deal with oil imports. 137 Such a purpose is clearly proper: oil is a
commodity at once essential to the national defense and national
security, and central to the foreign policy of the United States by
virtue of the political conditions obtaining in the Middle East. The
foreign policy consequences of the regulation of the importation of
oil dictate that the President, as the "sole organ" of the United
States in its foreign relations, be given broad authority to deal with
the oil situation, which goes far toward explaining why Congress
did not specify what it meant by adjusting imports.
A decisive consideration in interpreting the language of the
national security provision is that section 232 was amended by
Congress in the Trade Act of 1974 without changing the language
"to adjust the imports." 138 That Congress, in other sections of the
Act, dealt specifically with various import restrictions—principally
duties and quotas' 39—and yet did not elaborate on the meaning of
"to adjust the imports," argues strongly that it did not intend to
confine the executive action solely to import quotas. It is submitted
that Congress took it as self-evident that, where the national se-
curity is concerned, the President should be given the broadest pos-
sible discretion in exercising his statutorily delegated authority.
The third issue raised by the plaintiffs in Simon presents the
final question under the heading of delegated authority: whether the
President has exercised his authority in conformity with the statu-
tory procedures. The national security provision, as most recently
amended by the Trade Act of 1974, mandates that the Secretary of
the Treasury make an "appropriate" investigation and a report of
his findings accompanied by a recommendation for action or inac-
1 " Civil No. 74-0129 (D.D.C., Feb. 21, 1975). The court referred to, but did not cite,
statements by Senators Bennett and Milliken supporting this determination. During the
Senate debates on the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, ch. 169, 69 Stat. 162,
Senator Milliken, a member of the Senate Finance Committee, observed of § 7, the
predecessor of § 232, that "Lilt grants to the President authority to take whatever action
he deems necessary to adjust imports if they should threaten to impair the national security.
He may use tariffs, quotas, import taxes, or other methods of import restriction." 101 Cong.
Rec. 5299 (1955). Senator Bennett, another member of the Finance Committee, also indicated
that the bill gave to the President wider latitude than tariffs and quotas, 101 Cong. Rec. 5625
(1955).
"7 Senator Milliken indicated that protection from oil imports "was the purpose of
writing the amendment [national security provision] and of adopting it in the committee." 101
Cong. Rec. 5565 (1955).
1 " See discussion of § 232 at note 59 supra.
119 See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, §§' 101, 122, 88 Stat. 1982, 1987 (adding 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2111, 2232).
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tion. 14° In addition, the Secretary is to hold public hearings "if it is
appropriate. ) n 141 The plaintiffs turned a shotgun on these require-
ments; they contended: (l) that the Secretary failed to make recom-
mendations for action in terms contemplated by Congress; (2) that
he failed to hold public hearings without offering any explanation;
(3) that he failed to consult interested parties; (4) that he disregarded
the comprehensive process of deliberation contemplated by Con-
gress; and (5) that the investigation published by the Secretary
provided no basis for the action taken.' 42
Notwithstanding the plaintiffs' allegations, the court found that
the Secretary had made an appropriate investigation, had reported
his findings, and had recommended action to reduce oil imports.' 43
On the hearing issue, the majority observed that the national secu-
rity provision does not make a hearing mandatory, presumably to
allow rapid action in the event that the national security so requires,
and accordingly, refused to review the Secretary's discretion in
finding a hearing not appropriate: 1 ,44 Although acknowledging that
the process had been rapid, the court gave weight to Secretary
Simon's long involvement with the formulation of oil import policy
and to the extensive public exposure that the problem of United
States dependence upon foreign oil had already received.' 45
Although the provision for a hearing is an important procedural
safeguard where the problem posing a threat to national security is
not novel and unexpected, but rather one with which the President
has been dealing continuously for a long period of time under the
same authority, it is not unreasonable to accord him a degree of
flexibility that might be unwarranted in the case of action responsive
to a situation posing a threat to the national security for the first
time. In view of the global implications of the energy policy of the
United States, it may be expected that the executive branch, includ-
ing the Secretary of the Treasury, maintains a continuing oversight
of the oil import problem and is well aware of the interests of the
various domestic groups affected by the oil situation.
The deference accorded to the congressional delegation by the
court in Simon confirms that the nondelegation doctrine will not
hinder congressional efforts to grant broad power to the President to
regulate foreign commerce: Simon sanctions the use of the national
security clause to circumvent any vestigial restraints imposed by the
nondelegation doctrine, since it appears that a court will not ques-
tion a President's judgment on national security matters.'"
140 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1970), as amended by Trade Act of 1974, § 127(d), 88 Stat..
1993.
141 Id.
'42 Complaint of States at 19-20, Massachusetts v. Simon, Civil No. 74-0129 (D.D.C.,
Feb. 21, 1975).
143 Civil No. 74-0129 (D.D.C., Feb. 21, 1975).
144 Ed .
' 45 Id.
146 Plaintiffs in Simon conceded that "the President's determinhtion that his program is
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IV. CONCLUSION
The power to regulate foreign commerce that the President
derives from his independent constitutional authority is supple-
mented by the comprehensive authority delegated to him by trade
legislation. By this delegation, Congress has recognized that, as a
matter of expediency, the executive branch, by its control over the
foreign relations apparatus of the United States, is, in certain
categories of situations, the branch best able to deal with those
foreign commerce problems for which the domestic solution may
have significant effects on the foreign policy of the United States. In
the past, congressional delegation, combined with acquiescence in
independent presidential action, have moved commentators to de-
nounce congressional abdication and the resultant presidential
monopoly of foreign affairs as contrary to the allocation of power
ordained by the Constitution. i 47
 Recently, however, there have
been signs of congressional determination to reacquire a voice in
United States foreign policy. The Case Bill, enacted in 1972, re-
quires transmission of all international agreements to the Senate
within sixty days of their conclusion.'" The Trade Act of 1974
provides a comprehensive scheme of continuing congressional over-
sight, including congressional delegates to trade negotiations,'"
submissions of agreements to Congress,'" reports, 15 ' and president-
ial consultation with congressional advisors. 152 Nonetheless, in
spite of this reassertion of the right to congressional participation, it
may be predicted that the scope of presidential power to regulate
foreign commerce will not be significantly contracted. As inter-
dependence among nations increases in response to the pressures of
the allocation of scarce resources, the foreign affairs consequences of
the regulation of foreign commerce will require that the President's
broad powers be maintained and expanded. With the aid of con-
gressional oversight, it should be possible to combine effective regu-
lation with preservation of the constitutional allocation of power.
JEFFREY B. STORER
required in the interests of national security is a finding which is not subject to judicial
review." Id.
$ 47
 See, e.g., Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 Mich. L. Rev.
1, 55 (1972).
149
 1 U.S.C.A, § 112b (Supp. 1975).
149
 Trade Act of 1974, § 161, 88 Stat. 2008 (adding 19 U.S.C. § 2211).
15° Id. § 162, 88 Stat. 2008 (adding 19 U.S.C. § 2212).
151 Id.	 163, 88 Stat. 2009 (adding 19 U.S.C. § 2213).
152
 E.g., id. § 122(b)(2), 88 Stat. 1988 (adding 19 U.S.C. § 2132(bX2)).
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